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SYMPOSIA SUMMARY
The Best Offense is a Good Defense: Consumers’ Defense-Motivated Strategies and their
Effects on Memory, Choice, Preferences and Tastes
Martin Zemborain, Austral University, Argentina
SESSION OVERVIEW
In what ways are people strategic about maintaining their
ability to recall previous special memories? Which are the psycho-
logical processes driving consumers’ choice-motivated shifts in
their preferences for product features? What role does motivation
play in one’s preferences regarding physical characteristics of a
product, such as taste? The three lines of research presented in this
symposium seek to answer these questions, which share the same
underlying mechanism: consumers’ defense-motivated strategies.
This symposium provides a novel view and a deeper understanding
of fundamental issues in the consumer research field, such as
memory preservation, taste formation and choice. On a method-
ological note, the symposium also bridges between the “Behav-
ioral” and “Empirical modeling” data analysis methodologies used
in marketing research by showing how Bayesian techniques can be
successfully used to analyze experimental data (paper 2).
As mentioned above, the three papers presented here are
focused on defense-motivated strategies developed by consumers.
These defense-motivated strategies usually serve a self-preserving
goal. People may engage in attitude change to justify their choices
(Brehm 1956), or may prefer to distort their memories in order to
feel better about their past behavior (Mather, Shafir and Johnson
2000, 2003). Support for this contention is found in studies of
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) and the motivated reasoning
framework (Kunda 1990), which proposes that motivation affects
people’s reasoning through their reliance on a biased set of cogni-
tive processes (Chernev 2001). An extensive body of literature has
analyzed these defense-motivated strategies and their effects on
information processing (Russo, Medvec and Meloy 1996), choice
(Chernev 2001, Kivetz and Simonson 2000), repeated purchase
(Sen and Johnson 1997), information search (Hoch and Ha 1986,
Klayman and Ha 1987) and memory distortions (Mather, Shafir and
Johnson, 2000, 2003), to name a few. However, as pointed out
above, there are important questions that remain unanswered, some
of which will be addressed in this symposium.
In paper 1, Kim, Zauberman and Ratner test the memory
protection through acquisition hypothesis, a novel view on how
consumers try to preserve their memories for special occasions in
their lives. This hypothesis proposes that people seek to obtain
products that they think will help them remember a special experi-
ence, even though they would forego these same items in the
context of a non-special experience. Results from three studies
suggest that individuals prefer products that are uniquely associated
with a special memory rather than those that would not be associ-
ated with the memory or associated with both a special memory and
a memory that is less special. In addition, consumers’ desire for
these memory pointer products is enhanced when people are led to
believe that their memories are weaker.
Paper 2 (Zemborain, Johar and Ansari) analyzes the psycho-
logical processes governing choice-supportive distortions, or the
defense-motivated mechanisms used by consumers to justify their
choices. Unlike previous research based on dissonance theory
(Festinger 1957) which focused on how people tend to justify their
choices by increasing their liking or ratings to favor their chosen
products (i.e., the spread of alternatives effect), in this paper the
authors analyze how choice may shift consumers’ preferences at the
product feature level. Results from the first experiment show that
after making a choice, people prefer positive features of their
chosen products and negative features of their not chosen options,
presumably to justify their choices. Previous research showed that
people may distort their memories for past options in a choice
supportive fashion; such that positive features are attributed to
chosen products and negative features are attributed to forgone
alternatives (Mather, Shafir and Johnson 2000, 2003). These find-
ings, together with results from study 1, led the authors to hypoth-
esize that based on these attributions people would change the
attribute weights such that positive features attributed to chosen
products and negative features attributed to forgone alternatives
would become more important. Furthermore, if these changes in
attribute weights implied a choice-defensive strategy, then such
modifications should take place only when individuals were highly
confident about their feature source attributions. Results from study
2 support these predictions. The moderating effect of confidence in
the individuals’ attributions suggests that these changes in attribute
importance weights are indeed a defense-motivated strategy used
by consumers to justify their choices.
Paper 3 (Riis and McClure) seeks to answer the question
regarding whether taste change can be facilitated by motivation.
Specifically, this research explores the possibility that consumers’
concerns about health may lead to an actual change in the liking of
a product. Results from the first experiment show that regular Coke
drinkers who are highly concerned with health-related issues (i.e.,
motivated) expect to improve their liking for Diet Coke if asked to
drink this soda during a hypothetical two week consumption period
whereas regular Coke drinkers who are not concerned with health-
related issues (i.e., unmotivated) expect to like Diet Coke even less
when exposed to the same hypothetical situation. In study 2, heavy
drinkers of regular cola refrained from drinking that soda for two
weeks, consuming instead daily servings of Diet Coke. Results
from a blind test showed a marked increase in liking for Diet Coke
for all participants. However, in non-blind tests only participants
who had a high concern for the health consequences of sugared soda
consumption reported increased liking for Diet Coke. Furthermore,
this group reported a greater increase in intention to purchase Diet
Coke in the future.
Taken together, the three papers investigate how people de-
velop defense-motivated strategies in fundamental aspects of their
behavior, such as memory preservation, taste formation and choice.
This symposium offers a novel and comprehensive view of the
topic, and contributes to the field delivering a deeper understanding
of this phenomenon. The symposium also benefits from the partici-
pation of Professor Fishbach as discussant. Her expertise on moti-
vation and self-control ensures rich conclusions and suggestions for
future research based on the work presented here.
The three papers contribute to a research area that is relevant
to ACR members interested in memory processes, motivation,
intertemporal choice, preference formation, taste change, informa-
tion processing, and judgment and decision making. Regarding the
organization of the symposium, we plan to make 15 minutes
presentations, with about 5 minutes of questions following each
presentation and a 15-minute discussion at the end of the session
(total: 75 minutes).
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EXTENDED ABSTRACTS
“Memory Pointers: Strategic Memory Protection through
Acquisition of Recall Cues”
B. Kyu Kim, University of Pennsylvania
Gal Zauberman, University of Pennsylvania
Rebecca K. Ratner, University of Maryland
In this work, we focus on individuals’ desire to engage in what
we call strategic memory protection; that is, behaviors that people
think will allow them to protect their ability to derive utility from
memory. We focus here on a particular type of memory protection
and propose the memory protection through acquisition hypothesis,
where people seek to obtain products that they think will later help
them remember an earlier special experience, even though they
would forego these same items in the context of a non-special
experience.
Study 1 examines this hypothesis in a situation where a special
experience is to be followed by a second experience that could
interfere with individuals’ ability to retrieve the initial experience.
We ask all respondents to imagine having a special vacation trip to
a San Diego resort and ask half of them to imagine that they will be
returning to the same city for a business trip soon afterward, staying
in a different hotel. Consistent with our memory protection through
cue acquisition hypothesis, among respondents who expected an
upcoming business trip to the same city, participants were more
interested in the resort-specific cue (i.e., the bungalow magnet;
likelihood of buying on an 11-point scale, M=8.57) than in the
generic cue (i.e., the San Diego magnet; M=6.87). However, in the
vacation-only condition, participants reported a similar likelihood
to purchase the magnet when offered the resort-specific magnet vs.
the more generic California magnet (Ms=8.44 and 8.97, respec-
tively).
Study 2 further tests whether people seek to obtain physical
objects that they think will later help them to remember an earlier
special experience (i.e., a memory pointer), even though they would
forego these same items in the context of a non-special experience.
All respondents imagined going to a resort in Cancun, Mexico with
their significant other. Those in the special experience condition
imagined that the weather was excellent and they had a wonderful
vacation. Those in the non-special condition imagined that a huge
storm passed through the region and they had an unpleasant
vacation. Participants were asked to indicate their preference to buy
either a traditional Mayan wooden sculpture (i.e., a product that
would be thematically closely associated with the vacation) or a
limited version of a music CD of their favorite band (i.e., a product
that would not be closely associated thematically with the vacation)
on an 11-point scale. Results show that participants’ preference for
the sculpture was higher with the special experience (M=6.36) than
with the non-special experience (M=3.58), but preference for the
music CD did not differ significantly across experiences (M=7.04
with special experience and M=6.02 with non-special experience).
In addition, when imagining that they lost the sculpture after having
purchased it, they were upset more after the special (M=8.05) than
after the non-special resort experience (M=6.10), consistent with
the notion that they wanted it to serve as a recall cue only after the
special experience. However, when they imagined having lost the
music CD, no difference emerged between those considering spe-
cial vs. non-special experiences. This study also examines whether
they would be interested in replacing the lost sculpture if they found
an identical product at a local store. Content analysis shows that
whereas people perceive the item purchased as the resort to be a
good memory pointer, they perceive that a replacement item from
a local store would not be.
Study 3 seeks more direct evidence about the extent to which
being able to retrieve special memories plays a causal role in
guiding consumers’ behaviors. It has been shown in psychology
and consumer research that experienced ease or difficulty (com-
pared to content) of tasks affects evaluations and judgments in
decision making (Schwarz 1998; Wänke, Bohner, and Jurkowitsch
1997). In the context of the current research, we expected that
participants who were required to recall many past experiences that
are particularly special (e.g., 10 experiences) would experience
recall difficulty (and lack of processing fluency) and therefore
prefer a product that might serve as a cue to facilitate recall
following a special experience. However, those who were required
to recall only a few special experiences (e.g., 2 experiences) would
experience ease in the recall task (and greater processing fluency),
and this would lead to a reduced perceived need for a memory
pointer product. Results show that indeed participants who are
manipulated to believe that recalling past experiences is difficult
show stronger preference for a memory pointer product following
a special than non-special experience. Specifically, participants
who were induced to think that recalling past experiences is difficult
(i.e., recall 10 experiences) showed higher preference for a product
closely associated with the experience when the experience was
special (M=5.51) versus non-special experience (M=2.95). How-
ever, participants who were manipulated to think that recalling past
experiences is easy (i.e., recall 2 experiences) did not show any
difference in preference for this product that was closely associated
with the experience across the special vs. non-special experiences
(Ms=4.05 and 3.50).
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In conclusion, we show that individuals prefer products that
are uniquely associated with a special memory rather than those that
would not be associated with the memory or associated with both
a special memory and a memory that is less special. We further
show that individuals’ desire for these memory pointer products is
enhanced when they are led to believe that their memories are
weaker. These results all confirm our memory protection through
acquisition hypothesis. Whereas research in cognitive psychology
examines the actual impact of exposure to new information on one’s
ability to remember past experiences (e.g., retroactive interfer-
ence), our research program examines people’s lay theories about
the extent to which they might experience retroactive interference.
Our work demonstrates the behaviors that people engage in to
facilitate the retrieval of those past experiences that they most want
to remember without interference from other experiences.
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“Choice-Motivated Changes in Consumers’ Preferences”
Martin Zemborain, Austral University
Gita V. Johar, Columbia University
Asim M. Ansari, Columbia University
It has been shown that people may strategically distort their
memories and evaluations about past choices in order to justify
them (Tetlock, Stitka and Boettger 1989; Mather, Shafir and
Johnson, 2000, 2003; Festinger 1957). Although this phenomenon
has been reported extensively in the literature, little research ana-
lyzed the psychological process governing these choice-supportive
distortions, which is the focus of this research.
If after making a choice people develop a strategy to support
their decision, they should show a higher post-choice preference for
positive attributes of the chosen products (i.e., reasons to choose)
and for negative attributes of the not chosen products (i.e., reasons
to reject). Results from study 1 confirmed this assumption.
In study 1 we asked 39 participants to imagine that they were
planning to buy a house and they narrowed their choice down to two
houses. Then, the participants were presented with two options,
which were described in terms of eight features (four positive
features and four negative features) each. After they made their
choices, participants went through a filler task and then were
exposed to a list of 30 house attributes, of which sixteen corre-
sponded to the features of the houses they chose from, and fourteen
were new. Beside the attributes were two columns, one labeled
‘Check your 15 “must be positive” features in this column’ and the
other one labeled ‘Check your 15 “can be negative” features in this
column’. The participants’ task was to describe their preferred
house using exactly 15 positive and 15 negative features. They were
asked to place a check mark in the “Must be positive” column beside
each of the 15 corresponding features, and in the “Can be negative”
feature column beside each of the 15 corresponding features. A test
of proportions showed that people tended to choose to be positive
those attributes that were positive and belonged to their chosen
houses more than those that were positive and belonged to their not
chosen options (positive-chosen=58% vs. positive-not chosen=46%,
p<.05). Also, participants tended to pick to be positive those
attributes that were negative and belonged to their not chosen
houses more than those that were negative and belonged to their
chosen alternatives (negative-not chosen=51% vs. negative-cho-
sen=39%, p<.05).
Although results were consistent with our predictions, they did
not tell much about the psychological process governing this
choice-defensive mechanism. Results from study 1 and previous
research showing that people may distort their memories for past
options in a choice-supportive fashion (Mather, Shafir and Johnson
2000, 2003), led us to hypothesized that based on these distorted
memories people would change the attribute importance weights
such that positive features attributed to chosen products and nega-
tive features attributed to forgone alternatives would become more
important. Furthermore, if these changes in attribute weights im-
plied a choice-defensive strategy, then such modifications should
take place only when individuals were highly confident about their
feature attributions. Results from study 2 supported these predic-
tions. Upon arrival, participants were asked to rate the importance
of thirty attributes for each of three distinct product categories
(houses, restaurants and used cars). After a filler task, the students
were asked to make binary choices in those same three categories.
Each option was described in terms of four positive and four
negative features, all of which corresponded to the attributes rated
before. After an unrelated questionnaire; for each product category
participants were presented with a list of thirty two features (the
sixteen features that belonged to the choice options and sixteen new
features) and were asked to indicate whether each feature belonged
to their chosen product, to their not chosen product, or if it was new.
They also indicated how confident they were in their attributions,
on a seven-point scale anchored at 1 (Not at all confident) and 7
(Extremely confident). After indicating the sources of each feature,
participants were asked to recall which product they chose in each
category (we only report the results for the 126 students who
correctly remembered all three choices). Following another filler,
students were asked to rate again the importance of the attributes for
each of the three categories. Finally, and after another unrelated
questionnaire, participants completed the same choice task as in
experiment 1, for each of the three categories; and rated the valence
of each of the product features for which they reported the source.
To tap on the psychological processes driving consumers’
choice-defensive strategies, we analyzed the data in two different
ways. Our first main dependent variable was the difference between
participants’ post and pre-choice attribute importance ratings. To
properly account for the repeated measures design and individuals’
heterogeneity, we used a hierarchical Bayesian linear regression of
the main DV on participants’ reported feature source (i.e., chosen
product, not chosen product, or new feature), participants’ reported
confidence in such source attributions, and participants’ reported
feature valence (i.e., positive or negative). As expected, we found
a significant three-way interaction among the independent vari-
ables, such that attribute importance ratings were increased for
positive features attributed to chosen products and for negative
features attributed to not chosen products, only when participants’
confidence in their feature source attributions was high.
Our second dependent variable was the participants’ probabil-
ity of choosing a particular attribute to be positive in their preferred
product. We ran a hierarchical Bayesian probit in which we mod-
eled participants’ utility as a function of the change in the attribute
importance ratings, the participants’ reported feature source and the
participants’ reported feature valence. Results showed that indi-
viduals were more likely to choose an attribute to be positive if the
attribute importance weight increased after choice, if the attribute
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corresponded to a positive feature attributed to a chosen product or
if the attribute corresponded to a negative feature attributed to a not
chosen alternative.
Our results support our theorizing regarding the psychological
processes governing consumers’ choice-supportive distortions.
Interestingly, consumers’ preferences seemed to shift toward their
choices, suggesting that these distortions may go beyond choice
justification and have an effect in shaping consumers’ preferences.
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“Motivated Taste Change for Diet Coke”
Jason Riis, New York University
Samuel McClure, Princeton University
While a number of studies have shown that changes in prefer-
ence can occur with changes in consumption and exposure (Rozin,
1999), the question of whether taste change can be facilitated by
motivation is more controversial (Loewenstein & Angner, 2003).
Evidence for motivated taste change comes mostly from studies of
dissonance, whereby people are thought to reduce negative feelings
of disappointment by shifting their preferences to objects that
happen to be in their possession (Brehm, 1956). In the present work,
we investigate taste change that is motivated by concerns about
health, and find that such concerns can influence awareness of taste
change, and that this awareness has implications for future choice
intentions.
The particular source of motivation that we investigate is the
widespread concern about the health effects of sugared soda con-
sumption. Obesity is considered by some public health experts to be
the second leading cause of preventable death in America, and at
least a third of American adults are attempting to lose weight
(Kruger et al., 2004). Sugared sodas are thought to be one of the
major contributors to the obesity epidemic, and diet sodas are
rapidly gaining market share from sugared sodas.
Interestingly, many people claim that not only do they prefer
diet soda because it is healthier, but that they also prefer the taste.
In a pilot study with participants drawn from a paid, nationally
representative panel, we found that 85% of the 120 frequent Diet
Coke drinkers in the sample said that Diet Coke tasted better than
regular Coke. More impressively, however, 70% of those who
preferred the taste of Diet Coke said they used to prefer the taste of
regular Coke. They also cited concerns about health and fitness, and
not taste, as their original reason for switching to Diet Coke. These
data are consistent with the possibility that concerns about health
(i.e., motivation) led to an actual change in the liking of a product.
In the present studies we sought to test this possibility. In Study
1 we examined whether or not motivation is related to expectation
of taste change. We hypothesized that it would be. People tend to be
optimistic in their estimates of the likelihood of good outcomes
(Weinstein, 1980). Since health-motivated people would be more
likely to consider a taste improvement for a healthy product to be a
good outcome, they should thus be more likely to expect this
outcome to occur. This is indeed what we found. We asked 58
regular Coke drinkers (drawn from the same panel as the pilot
study) to indicate their agreement with the statement, “my con-
sumption of sugared soda is having a bad effect on my health and
fitness”. We considered people who agreed with the statement to be
“motivated” to change their taste, and people who disagreed with
the statement to be “unmotivated”. Both groups were similar in
their soda consumption and in their self reported liking of Coke and
Diet Coke. All participants were asked to imagine that they were to
drink Diet Coke daily for two weeks. The motivated people pre-
dicted that their liking of Diet Coke would improve during such a
trial, while the unmotivated people predicted that they would come
to like Diet Coke even less.
In Study 2 we actually examine taste change by exposing both
motivated and unmotivated Coke drinkers to Diet Coke for two
weeks. Based on previous mere exposure studies (e.g., Bertino et
al., 1982, 1986), we expected blind taste tests to reveal increased
liking of Diet Coke in both groups. In branded tests, however, we
expected the groups to differ, with the motivated participants being
more likely to report increased liking.
Undergraduate participants were selected based on a pre-
screening survey for heavy consumption of Coca Cola (mean of 3.8
cans per week) and for their level of concern about the effects of
sugared soda on their health. Half of the participants were highly
concerned (i.e., “motivated”) and half were minimally concerned
(i.e., “unmotivated”). The two groups did not differ in their soda
consumption habits. Both groups were given a two week supply of
Diet Coke, with the instruction to drink one can each day, and to
refrain from drinking sugared soda. (Compliance, reported anony-
mously, was very high.) Participants were not asked about their
expectations of taste change for fear that this would influence their
subsequent reporting. Two kinds of taste tests were given, both at
the beginning and end of the two week consumption period. In blind
tests, participants drank several colas in clear, unlabelled plastic
cups, and then rated the taste of each one on a 9 point scale
(anchored at “dislike very much” and “like very much”). In “branded”
taste tests, participants opened a can of Diet Coke, poured approxi-
mately one ounce into a clear plastic cup, tasted it, and then rated the
taste using the same 9 point scale.
Both high-concern and low-concern participants revealed a
large (4/5ths of a standard deviation) increase in liking of Diet Coke
following the two-week consumption period. However, with the
branded test, only the high concern participants revealed an in-
crease in liking. Furthermore, the high concern subjects reported a
greater increase in intention to purchase Diet Coke in the future.
These results suggest that motivation for taste change may be
independent of its actual occurrence, but that it may be required for
awareness of its occurrence, and, importantly, for the intent to act
on that taste change. The results do not isolate expectation as the
mechanism of the motivational effect, although the results of Study
1 are consistent with this possibility.
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